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he curve ﬁrst drawn byA.W. Phillips in 1958, highlighting a negative
relationship between wage inﬂation and unemployment, ﬁgured
prominentlyinthetheoryandpracticeofmacroeconomicpolicyduring
1958–1996.
Within a decade of Phillips’analysis, the idea of a relatively stable long-
run tradeoff between price inﬂation and unemployment was ﬁrmly built into
policy analysis in the United States and other countries. Such a long-run
tradeoff was at the core of most prominent macroeconometric models as of
1969.
Over the ensuing decade, the United States and other countries experi-
enced stagﬂation, a simultaneous rise of unemployment and inﬂation, which
threw the consensus about the long-run Phillips curve into disarray. By the
endofthe1970s,inﬂationwashistoricallyhigh—near10percent—andpoised
to rise further. Economists and policymakers stressed the role of shifting ex-
pectations of inﬂation and differed widely on the costliness of reducing inﬂa-
tion, in part based on alternative views of the manner in which expectations
were formed. In the early 1980s, the Federal Reserve System undertook
an unwinding of inﬂation, producing a multiyear interval in which inﬂation
fell substantially and permanently while unemployment rose substantially but
temporarily. Although costly, the disinﬂation process involved lower unem-
ployment losses than predicted by consensus macroeconomists, as rational
expectations analysts had suggested that it would.
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By 1996, the central bank of the United States had constructed a large-
scale rational expectations model, without any long-run tradeoff, which it
began to use to evaluate alternative policy scenarios. Monetary policymakers
atthattimeacceptedtheideathattherewasnolong-runtradeoffat, andabove,
the then-prevailing price inﬂation rate of 3 percent. Yet many felt that there
were important tradeoffs over short-run horizons, diversely deﬁned, and some
saw long-run tradeoffs near zero price inﬂation.
This article reviews the evolving role of the Phillips curve as an element
of macroeconomic policy during 1958–1996, as well as academic and cen-
tral bank research on it, via a series of snapshots over this roughly 40-year
period. In conducting the research summarized in this article, my motivation
is to better understand the mindset about the tradeoff between inﬂation and
unemployment over an important period of U.S. history with an eye toward
ultimately better understanding the joint behavior of the Federal Reserve and
the U.S. economy during that period. Diverse research in macroeconomics—
notablySargent(1999),Orphanides(2003),andPrimiceri(2006)—hassought
an explanation of inﬂation’s role in the behavior of a central bank that has an
imperfect understanding of the operation of the private economy. The per-
ceived nature of the Phillips curve plays an important role in these analyses,
so that my reading of U.S. history may provide input into future work along
these lines. I draw upon two distinct and complementary sources of informa-
tion,publishedarticlesanddocumentsoftheFederalOpenMarketCommittee
(FOMC), to trace the evolving interpretation of the tradeoff over this roughly
40-year period.
The discussion is divided into six sections that follow this introduction.
Section 1 provides a quick overview of the U.S. experience with price inﬂa-
tion and unemployment during 1958–1996. As the objective of this article is
to provide a description of how policymakers’ visions of the Phillips curve
may have evolved during this time, resulting from empirical and theoretical
developments, it is useful to have these series in mind as we proceed. Section
2 describes the birth of the Phillips curve as a policy tool, highlighting three
core contributions: Phillips’ original analysis of U.K. data, Samuelson and
Solow’s (1961) estimates of the curve on U.S. data and their depiction of it as
a menu for policy choice, and the econometric analysis by Klein et al. (1961)
and Sargan (1964) of the interrelationship between wage inﬂation, price in-
ﬂation, and unemployment, which formed the background for wage and price
blocks of macroeconomic policy models. Section 3 depicts the battle against
unemploymentthattheUnitedStateswagedduringthe1962–1968periodand
its relationship to the Phillips curve in then-prominent macroeconomic policy
models. Section 4 discusses the breakdown of the empirical Phillips curve
during 1969–1979, a period including intervals of stagﬂation in which unem-
ployment and inﬂation rose together, and theoretical criticisms of the Phillips
curve as a structural macroeconomic relation. Section 5 indicates the role ofR. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 313
thePhillipscurveduringtheunwindingofinﬂationintheUnitedStatesduring
1980through1986. Section6concernsseveralaspectsofpolicymodelingand
policy targeting in 1996 as the United States returned to a sustained interval
of relatively low inﬂation. Section 7 concludes.
1. INFLATIONAND UNEMPLOYMENT, 1958–1996
Since my discussion focuses on studies of inﬂation and unemployment that
were written during 1958 through 1996, it seems useful to start by providing
information on U.S. inﬂation and unemployment over that historical period,
augmented by a few initial years, as in Figure 1. As measured by the year-
over-year percentage change in the gross domestic product deﬂator, inﬂation
averaged just under 4 percent, starting and ending the 1955–1996 interval at
about 2.5 percent. Inﬂation twice exceeded 10 percent, in 1974–75 and 1981.
The unemployment rate averaged 6 percent, starting and ending the sample
period near 5 percent. Recession intervals, as dated by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER), are highlighted by the shaded lines in Figure
1.
My snapshots of the Phillips curve and its role in macroeconomic policy
are usefully divided into ﬁve periods.
• The formative years in which the initial studies were conducted, 1955–
1961. During this interval, there were two recessions (August 1957
through April 1958 and April 1960 through February 1961), each of
which was marked by declining inﬂation and rising unemployment.
• Thebattleagainstunemploymentfrom1962through1968duringwhich
unemployment fell substantially, with inﬂation being at ﬁrst quiescent
and then rising substantially toward the end of the period.
• The breakdown of the Phillips curve empirically and intellectually
came from 1969 through 1979. In this period, there were two re-
cessions. During December 1969–November 1970, both inﬂation and
unemployment rose but there was a brief decline in inﬂation within the
recession. During November 1973 through March 1975, inﬂation and
unemployment both rose dramatically. This period was a tumultuous
one, marked by departure from gold standard, wage and price controls,
energy shocks, as well as difﬁcult political and social events.
• The unwinding of inﬂation took place during 1980 through 1985, with
a substantial reduction in inﬂation accompanied by a sustained period
of unemployment.
• In the aftermath, 1986–1996, the Phillips curve assumed a new form
in monetary policy models and monetary policy discussions.314 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Inﬂation and Unemployment, 1955–1996
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Notes: The inﬂation rate is the year-over-year change in the gross domestic product
(GDP) deﬂator, the unemployment rate is the civilian unemployment rate, quarterly aver-
ages of monthly ﬁgures. All data from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The shaded grey areas are NBER reces-
sions, while the vertical black lines separate the tenures of the various Federal Reserve
chairman whose names appear below the horizontal axis.
2. THE FORMATIVEYEARS
Figure 2 is the dominant image from Phillips’initial article: a scatter plot of
measures of wage inﬂation and unemployment in the United Kingdom over
1861–1913 supplemented by a convex curve estimated by a simple statisti-
cal procedure. During the 1960s, U.S. macroeconomic policy analysis and
models were based on a central inference from this ﬁgure, which was that
a permanent rise in inﬂation would be a necessary cost of permanently re-
ducing unemployment. However, as background to that period, it is useful
for us to understand how the Phillips curve was estimated initially, how it
crossed theAtlantic, and how it was modiﬁed so that it could be imported into


























Notes: This is Figure 1 from Phillips (1958), displaying the relationship between unem-
ployment and wage inﬂation over 1861–1913. The dots represent annual observations,
while the crosses represent trade cycle averages.
The Original Study
Phillips(1958)describedtheobjectiveofhisstudyasfollows: “toseewhether
statistical evidence supports the hypothesis that the rate of change of money
wage rates in the United Kingdom can be explained by the level of unemploy-
ment and the rate of change of unemployment, except in or immediately after
those years in which there was a very rapid rise in import prices, and if so to
form some quantitative estimate of the relation between unemployment and
therateofchangeofmoneywagerates.”1 Hebeganwiththestudyofinﬂation
and unemployment over multiyear periods, which he called trade cycles, and
then he assembled these intervals into the overall curve that bears his name.
Trade cycles and the Phillips curve
The celebrated trade-off curve was derived by a complicated procedure. First,
Phillipsexploredthebehaviorofameasureofwagechangeandunemployment
1 Phillips (1958, 284).316 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
over a series of historical United Kingdom “trade cycles,” an alternative label
for the sort of business cycles that Burns and Mitchell (1946) had identiﬁed
fortheUnitedStates.2 Thecyclefor1868–1879isshowninPanelAofFigure
3. It begins with several years of falling unemployment and rising wage
inﬂation, then an interval of rapidly declining wage inﬂation and modestly
rising unemployment, then a number of years of wage declines accompanied
by substantially increasing unemployment. Over the course of this cycle,
there was an initial interval (1868–1872) during which inﬂation rose by about
10 percent, while unemployment dropped by about 5 percent. Then, from
1872–1875, there was a period of sharply declining inﬂation accompanied by
modestly rising unemployment. Finally, from 1876–1879, there was a period
of negative inﬂation (−1t o−3 percent per year) coupled with dramatically
rising unemployment.
Phillips’ identiﬁcation of the tradeoff between inﬂation and unemploy-
ment did not rely on the shape of the cyclical pattern over the course of this
and other individual trade cycles. Instead, the wage inﬂation and unemploy-
ment observations over the 1868–1879 trade cycle were averaged by Phillips
to produce one of the “+” points in Figure 2, with the long-run curve ad-
justed so that it ﬁt through these cycle averages.3 The curve, ﬁtted to six “+”
points, contained three free parameters and implied that very low values of
unemployment would lead to very high inﬂation, while very high values of
unemployment would lead to very low inﬂation.4
Thus,thePhillipscurvewasbasedonaverageinﬂationandunemployment
observations over the course of trade cycles of varying lengths. Although it
was sometimes criticized as capturing short-run relations, Phillips’procedure
contained signiﬁcant lower frequency information. Yet, these cycle averages
were drawn from the period when the United Kingdom was on the gold stan-
dard so that there were limits to the extent of price inﬂation or deﬂation.
Exploration of subsequent periods
Afterestimatingthelong-runcurveon1861–1913data,Phillipsthenexamined
the extent to which the subsequent behavior of wage inﬂation and unemploy-
ment could be understood using the curve.
2 Phillips’ annual wage inﬂation observations are effectively a two-period average of the in-
ﬂation rate in the future year and the current year.
3 To explain the cyclical pattern around the long-run curve, Phillips developed a theory in
which wage inﬂation was affected negatively both by the rate of change and level of unemployment.
That part of his analysis was less broadly taken up by subsequent researchers, although there was
a signiﬁcant literature on “Phillips loops” during the 1970s.
4As in Phillips, letting y be the wage inﬂation and x be unemployment, the ﬁtted curve took
the form y =− .9 + 9.638x−1.394, with the paremeters selected by a combination of least-squares
and trial-and-error (Phillips 1958, 285).R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 317





















Curve fitted to 1861--1913 data

























Curve fitted to 1861--1913 data
Panel C
Notes: A key part of Phillips’ analysis was to study the behavior of unemployment and
wage inﬂation over various trade cycles, with three early cycles shown in this ﬁgure.
For each, Phillips computed a cycle average, which was then used as one of the central
data points through which he drew the long-run curve shown in Figure 1 (+). Panel A
is Figure 3 from Phillips (1958); Panel B is Figure 9 from Phillips (1958); Panel C is
Figure 10 from Phillips (1958). In all panels, the horizontal axis is unemployment and
the vertical axis is wage inﬂation, as in Figure 2.318 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Lookingat1913–1948asshowninPanelBofFigure3,Phillipsconcluded
that the general approach worked well. In particular, the trade cycle of 1929–
1937 ﬁt his general pattern, but he puzzled somewhat over the relatively high
rates of inﬂation in 1935–1937. Other parts of the 1913–1948 interval ﬁt in
less well. As potential explanations of the behavior of wage inﬂation during
both the First World War and the subsequent deﬂation to return the pound
to its pre-war parity, Phillips discussed the potential importance of cost-of-
living changes (effects of price inﬂation on wage-setting) as contributing to
wage inﬂation in the wartime period and to wage deﬂation during the post-
WWIinterval). Thesharpdeclinesinnominalwageratesin1921and1922,as
Britain returned to pre-war parity with gold, stand out dramatically in Panel B
of Figure 3. Although these points lie far from the curve based on 1861–1913
data, theyaredramaticoutliersthatneverthelessshowanegativecomovement
of inﬂation and unemployment in line with Phillips’general ideas.
Phillips also explored the consistency of the period following the Second
World War, 1948–1957, with his long-run curve. During this period, U.K.
unemployment was at a remarkably low level (between 1 and 2 percent) and
inﬂation varied widely, as shown in Panel C of Figure 3. Phillips commented
on several aspects of this interval. First, he noted that a governmental policy
of wage restraint was in place in 1948 and apparently temporarily retarded
wage adjustments. Second, he noted that the direction of the trade-cycle
“loop” had reversed from the earlier period, which he suggested might be
due to a lag in the wage-setting process. Third, he used this period to show
how his curve could be used to partition wage inﬂation into a “demand-pull”
component, associated with variation in unemployment along the curve and
other factors, which induced departures from the curve. After looking at retail
price inﬂation during this period, Phillips suggested that some of the wage
inﬂation observations, such as the 1948 value that lies well above the curve,
couldhavearisenfrom“cost-push”considerationsinwhichworkersbargained
aggressively for higher nominal wages. However, Phillips concluded that the
post-WWII period was broadly consistent with the curve ﬁt to the 1861–1913
data.
U.S. Background to a Vast Experiment
In 1960, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow examined U.S. data on the rate of
change in average hourly earnings in manufacturing and the annual average
dataonunemploymentoveranunspeciﬁedsampleperiod,whichismostlikely
1890throughthelate1950s.5 Theirempiricalanalysismostcloselyresembles
5 Samuelson and Solow (1960) indicate that their study is based on the data of Rees, which
is most likely his 1961 monograph on real wages in manufacturing, where the earliest data is
1890.R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 319
































































Notes: Panel A shows annual unemployment and wage inﬂation in U.S. data (this is
Figure 1 from Samuelson and Solow [1961]), with their ﬁgure notes indicating that circled
points are for “recent years.” Panel B shows the trade-off curve that Samuelson and
Solow discussed for the United States (this is Figure 2 in their article).
the 1861–1913 Phillips analysis that we have just looked at, but the overall
association was looser, as dramatically displayed in PanelA of Figure 4.
Like Phillips, Samuelson and Solow looked at sub-samples, noting that
money wages rose or failed to fall during the high unemployment era of 1933
to 1941, which they suggested might be due to the workings of the New320 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Deal. Further, they noted that theWorldWar I period also failed to ﬁt into the
expected pattern, in line with Phillips’ﬁndings discussed above.
Overall, though, Samuelson and Solow argued that “the bulk of the obser-
vations—the period between the turn of the century and the ﬁrst war, the
decade between the end of that war and the Great Depression, and the most
recent ten or twelve years—all show a rather consistent pattern. Wage rates
do tend to rise when the labor market is tight, and the tighter the faster.” They
noted with interest that “the relation, such as it is, has shifted upward slightly
but noticeably in the forties and the ﬁfties.” In the early years, before and
after the ﬁrst war, “manufacturing wages seem to stabilize absolutely when
4 or 5 percent of the labor force is unemployed; and wage increases equal to
the productivity increase of 2 to 3 percent per year is the normal pattern at
about 3 percent unemployment” and described this ﬁnding as “not so terribly
different” from Phillips’ results. In the later years, 1946–1959, Samuelson
and Solow judged that it “would take more like 8 percent unemployment to
keep money wages from rising and that they would rise at 2 to 3 percent per
yearwith5or6percentofthelaborforceunemployed.”6 Itistheselateryears
that Samuelson and Solow circled in Panel B of Figure 4.
Todescribethepolicyimplicationsoftheirﬁndings,SamuelsonandSolow
(1961) drew a version of the Phillips curve as representing tradeoffs between
price inﬂation and unemployment. Essentially, this involved using the idea
that price inﬂation and wage inﬂation were different mainly by the growth
of labor productivity, suggesting an implicit model of relatively quick pass-
through from wages to prices.
To obtain price stability under the assumption that real wages would grow
at2.5percentperyear, theysuggestedthattheAmericaneconomywouldhave
to experiencea5t o6percent rate of unemployment (this option is marked
as pointA in Panel B of Figure 4). By contrast, they suggested that “in order
to achieve the nonperfectionist’s goal of 3 percent unemployment, the price
index might have to rise by 4 to 5 percent per year” (this option is marked as
point B).7
Seeking to understand whether inﬂation originated from cost-push or
demand-pull factors, Samuelson and Solow described a “vast experiment”
in which “by deliberate policy one engineered a sizeable reduction in de-
mand” so as to explore the effects on unemployment and inﬂation. Although
they were not explicit about the mechanism, they likely shared the prevailing
Keynesian view of the time that ﬁscal and other policies that cut aggregate
demand would ﬁrst increase unemployment, with higher unemployment then
reducing wage and price inﬂation. One interpretation of the subsequent 30
6All quotations in this paragraph are from Samuelson and Solow (1961, 189).
7 Samuelson and Solow (1961, 192).R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 321
years of U.S. history is that versions of such experiments, with both increases
and decreases in demand, were repeatedly undertaken.8
The Samuelson and Solow analysis led to a detailed research program of
estimating the long-run tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment in the
United States. Given that interpretation and the subsequent development of
macroeconometric models, it is interesting to note that Samuelson and Solow
(1961) included a foreshadowing of future critiques of the long-run tradeoff:
“aside from the usual warning that these are simply our best guesses, we must
give another caution. All of our discussion has been phrased in short-run
terms, dealing with what might happen in the next few years. It would be
wrong, though, to think that our menu (Figure 4B) that relates obtainable
price and unemployment during the next few years will maintain its shape in
the longer run.” They pointed to two reasons for potential instability—one
was that “wage and other expectations” might shift the position of the Phillips
curve and the other was that “institutional reforms” including product and
labor market regulations or direct wage and price controls might shift the
American Phillips curve downward and to the left.9 Both expectations and
wage-price controls were to play an important role in the subsequent history
of the Phillips curve in the United States and other countries.
Wages, Prices, and Lags
MacroeconomicmodelsalongKeynesianlinesﬁrstaimedatcapturingthedy-
namics of aggregate demand. Thus, for example, the Duesenberry, Eckstein,
and Fromm (1960) simulation study of the U.S. economy in recession used a
quarterly econometric model with 14 equations governing aggregate demand:
it contained neither a monetary sector nor a wage-price block. That is, the
interaction between shocks and the components of aggregate demand was
viewed as ﬁrst order for understanding the behavior of the U.S. economy in a
recession, with implications for wages and prices or their inﬂuences taken as
less important. Fiscal policy measures rather than monetary policy measures
were introduced in many studies of the time, reﬂecting a professional focus
on ﬁscal rather than monetary policy tools.
Yet,aftertheseﬁrststages,U.K.andU.S.modelbuildersintroducedablock
of equations for wages and prices, stimulated in part by the work of Phillips
(1958). The monograph by Klein et al. (1961) reports on a multiyear project
to construct quarterly U.K. data and to estimate an econometric model with a
8All quotations in this paragraph are from Samuelson and Solow (1961, 191).
9All quotations in this paragraph are from Samuelson and Solow (1961) page 193 except
for the ﬁnal one, which is from page 194.322 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
wage-price sector. These authors found that distributed lags were important




for model properties. Sargan, therefore, studied a wage equation of the form
Wt − Wt−1 = λ(Wt−1 − Pt−1) + βut−1 + γt+ ξft + φ(Pt−1 − Pt−4), (1)
where Wt is the log nominal wage rate in quarter t, Pt is the log nominal price
level, ut is the unemployment rate, and ft is a measure of the political party in
power. He divided the analysis of this equation into two components. First,
an equation that described wage changes as deriving from deviations from an
equilibrium real wage,
Wt − Wt−1 = λ[Wt−1 − Pt−1 − wt−1], (2)













(Pt−1 − Pt−4)]. (3)
Thisissimplyanalgebraicdecomposition,butSargan(1964)wasinsistentthat
theelementsoftheequilibriumwageprocessmadeinternalsense,forexample
requiring that the coefﬁcient
γ
λ is interpretable as the effect of productivity
growth on the real wage. He also interpreted the parameter λ as a speed of
adjustment toward the equilibrium.11
Following the work of Klein et al., Sargan also estimated a price equa-
tion that linked prices to wages. Sargan explored measures of productivity,
demand, and relative input costs as additional determinants of prices. Com-
bining the wage and price equations, Sargan was able to trace out dynamic
consequences of changes in the unemployment rate on wages and prices.
These were inﬂuenced by the strength of the equilibrating tendencies (λ) and
the inﬂuence of the price terms (φ) from the wage equation. For example,
even if there were no lags of wages in the wage equation, there still could be
indirect effects coming from the presence of price lags.
10 These results echoed the earlier ﬁndings of Fisher (1926) who had, in fact, invented the
concept of a distributed lag for the purpose of empirical analysis of inﬂation and interest rates.
More generally, the estimation of wage-price blocks has provided the basis for many advances in
time series econometrics. In particular, Sargan (1964) used the wage-price block of Klein et al.
(1961) as the basis for an investigation that was the starting point for the so-called London School
of Economics (LSE) approach to econometric dynamics. For a recent study of the UK Phillips
curve, using Sargan’s work as its starting point, see Castle and Hendry (Forthcoming).
11 Sargan also investigated generalization of the ﬁrst speciﬁcation to allow for additional lags
of wage changes, Wt − Wt−1 = λ[Wt−1 − Pt−1 − we
t−1] +
 J
j=1 δj(Wt−j − Wt−j−1) to enrich
this dynamic adjustment process toward equilibrium.R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 323
Sargan (1964) concluded that there was a long-run tradeoff between wage
inﬂation and unemployment, but that there were also lengthy average lags so
that changes in unemployment and other variables would take several years to
be fully reﬂected in wage inﬂation. These broad properties were widely built
into Keynesian macroeconometric models, as wage and price sectors were
added to the initial aggregate demand constructions.
3. THE BATTLEAGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT
The 1962 Economic Report of the President was the ﬁrst prepared by the
Kennedy Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), which was eager to imple-
ment “The New Economics” originating in the work of Keynes.12 The 1962
Report discussed the origins of unemployment in labor market frictions and
in aggregate demand conditions, concluding that the “objective of maximum
employment” would have to use policies aimed principally at labor market
conditions. The 1962 Report argued that “in the existing economic circum-
stances, an unemployment rate of about 4 percent is a reasonable and prudent
full employment target for stabilization policy,” further stressing that addi-
tional policy interventions to reduce structural unemployment would make it
possible to further reduce that target. At the same time, the Report built the
case that the macroeconomic conditions of the late 1950s and early 1960s had
led to an “output gap” of between 4 and 10 percent. As shown in the top panel
of Figure 5, the output gap was the difference between actual output and a
smooth trend line, based on an assumed level and rate of growth of capacity.
Based on the work of a young economist at the CEA (Okun 1962), unem-
ployment was linked to the output gap, so that a 2-percentage-point higher
unemployment rate was related to an output gap of 5 percent. That is, the
Report built in an Okun’s Law coefﬁcient of 2.5 to produce the second panel
ofFigure5. Whilethe“Phillipscurvetradeoff”isnowfrequentlydiscussedin
terms of inﬂation and the output gap using some version of Okun’s Law, this
articlewillmaintaintheoriginallinkagebetweeninﬂationandunemployment
as its focus.
In fact, the Kennedy-Johnson administration did deliver a substantial de-
cline in unemployment, as a look back at Figure 1 conﬁrms. In keeping with
the tenor of the times, in which a package of ﬁscal, structural, and monetary
policieswasviewedasnecessaryforandcapableofproducingthisdecline,the
presentarticlewillnotseektoseparatelyidentifythecontributionsofdifferent
types of policies. Histories of the period, such as Hetzel (2008, chapters 6
and 7), stress the coordination of ﬁscal and monetary decisionmaking, so that
such an identiﬁcation could be quite subtle.
12 Walter Heller was the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors from 1961–64, with
the other members being Kermit Gordon and James Tobin. The terminology “new economics” was
widely used at the time and apparently dates back to a 1947 volume by Seymour Harris.324 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly






















































Panel B: Unemployment and the Output Gap
GNP Gap as Percent of Potential (Left Scale)
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1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Notes: Panel A is the CEA’s potential, actual, and output gap decomposition, while
Panel B shows the link between the output gap and the unemployment rate. The CEA
economists attached notes as follows: aSeasonally adjusted annual rates; bpotential out-
put based on a 31
2 percent trend line through the middle of 1955; cunemployment as a
percent of civilian labor force, seasonally adjusted; A, B, and C represent GNP in the
middle of 1963, assuming an unemployment rate of 4 percent, 5 percent, and 6 per-
cent, respectively. They listed their sources as: Department of Commerce, Department
of Labor, and Council of Economic Advisors.R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 325
The 1962 Report did note that “the economy last experienced 4 percent
unemployment in the period May 1955–August 1957....During this period,
wages and prices rose at rates which impaired the competitiveness of some
U.S. goods in world markets. However, there is good reason to conclude
that upward pressures of this magnitude are not a permanent and systematic
feature of our economy when it is operating in the neighborhood of 4 percent
unemployment.” Looking back at Figure 1, the reader will notice that the
inﬂation rate rose by several percentage points during the 1955–1957 period
alluded to in the CEA report, while unemployment averaged about 4 percent.
By the late 1960s, some version of the long-run Phillips curve tradeoff
had become a cornerstone of economic policy. It entered centrally in macro-
economic models and more ephemerally in macroeconomic reports.13
Macroeconomic Models
In fall 1970, the Federal Reserve System sponsored a major conference on
“The Econometrics of Price Determination,” which contained a wide range
of studies and later appeared in 1972 as a volume edited by Otto Eckstein.
Drawn from one of these studies, Figure 6 displays the long-run relationship
between price inﬂation and unemployment as of 1969 within three prominent
macroeconomic models of the sort used by the U.S. private sector for fore-
casting purposes, by the executive branch of the U.S. government, and by the
U.S. central bank. This ﬁgure is reproduced from the Hymans (1972) survey
of the price dynamics within the Ofﬁce of Business Economics (OBE) model
used by the executive branch, the Federal Reserve-MIT-Penn (FMP) model
used by the central bank, and the DHL-III model developed by Hymans and
Shapiro at the University of Michigan.
As Hymans explains (1972, 313), this ﬁgure was produced by taking
the wage-price block of the various models and evaluating these equations
at alternative unemployment rates. One ﬁrst ﬁnds the long-run inﬂation rate
when the unemployment rate is constant at, say 5 percent, and then one ﬁnds
the long-run inﬂation rate at 4 percent and so on.
By and large, these estimates of the long-run relationship accord well
with that portrayed by Samuelson and Solow (1961) and reproduced as Panel
B of Figure 4 in this article. Further, the increase in the inﬂation rate from
about 1 percent in 1960–61 to about 4.5 percent in 1968–69 is particularly
well captured by the FMP and DHL models. Although each long-run Phillips
curve is nonlinear and there are differences in models, the “average” tradeoff
13As, for example, in the “Phillips plot without a Phillips curve” of the 1969 Report, dis-
cussed further below. Presumably, the economists at the CEA were not too interested in taking
“credit” for the effect of low unemployment on inﬂation, while the economists at the Federal
Reserve Bank (FRB) had a model that featured the tradeoff and could not escape the connection.326 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly






































Global Unemployment Rate (Percent)
Notes: The long-run inﬂation and unemployment tradeoff in three prominent macro-
econometric models as of 1970. The ﬁgure also shows actual unemployment and inﬂation
(annual averages) during 1960–1969.
Source: Hymans (1972).
over this range is that lowering unemployment by 2.5 percent (from 6 to 3.5)
costs about 3.5 percent in terms of inﬂation (from 1 percent to 4.5 percent).
Smallerchangesininﬂationandunemploymentfeaturearoughlyone-for-one
tradeoff.
The dynamics of wages and prices were studied by many authors under a
variety of assumptions within the FMP and other large models. For example,R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 327
de Menil and Enzler (1972) considered the effect of changing the unemploy-
ment rate from 4 percent to 5 percent in the FMP model: The results of their
investigations are shown in Figure 7. The economy is assumed to be in an
initial steady state with price inﬂation of 3.4 percent per year (wage inﬂation
is just over 6 percent) and unemployment of 4 percent. Then, unemployment
increased to 5 percent at date 1 and at all future dates. The inﬂation rate de-
clines to 2.7 percent after four quarters, to 2.2 percent after three years and to
1.9 percent after ﬁve years. Compensation per man-hour (the wage measure)
drops from 6 percent to 4.9 percent after a year, to 4.6 percent after three
years, and to 4.4 percent after ﬁve years. The more rapid response of wage
inﬂation is related to the fact that unemployment affects wages immediately,
with effects of wages on prices occurring only with a distributed lag.14
Overall, the short-run Phillips curve reported by de Menil and Enzler
(1972) is ﬂatter than the long-run one that they report (essentially that for the
FMP in Figure 6): a 1 percent increase in unemployment brings about a .7
percentchangeafterayear’stime,buta1.5percentdeclineininﬂationafterﬁve
year’stime. Fromthestandpointoftheeconometricmodelersofthetime, this
was a natural result of the lags in the wage-price components of their model,
built in along Klein-Sargan lines. Looking at Figure 6, economists such as
de Menil and Enzler likely saw a consistency with the dynamic speciﬁcation
of the macroeconomic policy model: the historical inﬂation rate initially lies
below the long-run Phillips curve in the early 1960s during the start of the
transition to lower unemployment.
Macroeconomic Reports
The1969EconomicReportofthePresident wasthelastreportoftheKennedy-
Johnson era and was prepared under the leadership of Arthur Okun. With
inﬂation rising, early 1968 saw a new cabinet-level Committee on Price Sta-
bility charged to recommend actions to contain inﬂation. President Johnson’s
introductoryremarksintheReportdistinguishedbetween“roadstoavoid”and
“roads to reducing inﬂation.” The roads to avoid were an “overdose of ﬁscal
and monetary restraint” or “mandatory wage and price controls.” The “roads
to follow” included a combined ﬁscal and monetary program—including a
continuation of the 1968 tax surcharge—as a “ﬁrst line of defense,” but also
14 Note that de Menil and Enzler’s (1972) experiment assumes an immediate and permanent
change in unemployment induced by macroeconomic policies. Given the nature of the wage-price
block in the FMP model, it was conceptually feasible to simply change unemployment and trace
out the implications for wage and price inﬂation. However, since changes in ﬁscal and monetary
instruments had only a gradual effect on aggregate demand and unemployment within the FMP
and similar models, responses to more standard policy changes were more complicated and had
gradual effects on both inﬂation and unemployment.328 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Source: de Menil and Enzler (1972).
voluntary cooperation in wage and price setting to aid the process of reducing
inﬂation.
The 1969 Report portrayed the U.S. economy as running at or slightly
above potential output, with associated unemployment in the neighborhood
of 4 percent. As portrayed in Figure 8, the potential output series resembles
that presented in the 1962 Report (Figure 5), but the detailed notes make
clearthatpotentialoutputgrewat3.5percentover1955–1962; at3.75percent
over 1963–1965; and at 4 percent over 1966–1968. Thus, an acceleration of
potentialoutputgrowthwasnecessarytoﬁttogetherthe1962Report’sviewof
4 percent as the unemployment target, which ﬁnally was hit in the latter years
of the Kennedy-Johnson era, with the behavior of output during those years.
With more modest potential output, there would have been a very negative
output gap during the ﬁnal years of the Kennedy-Johnson era, whereas it is
only slightly negative in Figure 8.
The 1969 Report also featured a Phillips scatter plot, from 1954–1968,
highlighting the historical relationship between “price performance andR. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 329




































Panel A: Gross National Product in 1958 Prices



















GNP Gap as Percent of Potential (Left Scale)
Unemployment Rate  (Right Scale) c
Notes: Panel A shows the CEA’s potential, actual, and output gap decomposition, while
Panel B shows the link between the output gap and the unemployment rate. The CEA
economists attached notes as follows: aSeasonally adjusted annual rates;bpotential output
is a trend line of 31
2 percent through the middle of 1955 to 1962 IV, 31
4 percent from
1962 IV to 1965, and 4 percent from 1965 IV to 1968 IV; cunemployment as a percent of
civilian labor force, seasonally adjusted. They list as sources: Department of Commerce,
Department of Labor, and Council of Economic Advisors.
unemployment” during the Kennedy-Johnson years, although no trade-off
curve was displayed. The decline in unemployment from the 5.5 percent level
of 1963 to the 3.5 percent level of 1968 was associated with a rise in inﬂation
from1.5percenttocloseto4percent. TheReport’saccompanyingdiscussion330 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of the historical record stresses the importance of a wage-price spiral arising
from demand growth in excess of capacity growth. It argued that “once such
a spiral starts, it becomes increasingly difﬁcult to arrest, even after productive




inﬂationary, a viewpoint that echoes the appraisal in the 1962 Report. The
rise in inﬂation over the eight years of the Kennedy-Johnson administration
is, therefore, implicitly portrayed as arising from the effects of a wage and
price spiral, not a purposeful movement along a long-run Phillips curve.
4. BREAKDOWN, 1969–1979
The breakdown of the consensus concerning the long-run Phillips curve
involved a major revision of macroeconomic theory along with an unusual
pattern of inﬂation and unemployment, with these intertwined developments
reinforcing each other.
Macroeconomic Theory
As the Phillips curve played an increasing role in macroeconomic models,
and as inﬂation rose during the mid-1960s, economists began to take a harder
look at its theoretical underpinnings. The implications of new models were
then compared to unemployment and inﬂation data, with results that sparked
a major empirical controversy and a revolution in macroeconomic modeling.
The natural rate hypothesis
In the late 1960s, Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps made separate argu-
ments about why the long-run Phillips curve should be vertical. Friedman
(1968) began from a vision of the labor market in which real wages and em-
ployment(orunemployment)werejointlydeterminedinresponsetolocaland
aggregate conditions of supply and demand. His natural rate of unemploy-
ment was “the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of
general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them the actual
structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including mar-
ket imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of
gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs
of mobility, and so on.” He then imagined a situation in which ﬁrms offered
workers nominal rather than real wages, with workers evaluating labor supply
opportunities based on their best estimate of the purchasing power of those
wages. With a known path for the price level, this calculation is easy forR. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 331
workers, but it becomes harder when the price level is changing. Friedman
(1968) imagined the central bank increasing the growth of the money supply
and stimulating the demand for the ﬁnal product. To hire additional work-
ers, ﬁrms would offer higher nominal wages. Faced with higher nominal
wages that were interpreted as higher real wages, workers would supply more
hours and potential workers would accept more jobs. So, it was possible for
Friedman’s model to reproduce a Phillips curve of sorts. However, if workers
correctly understood that the general level of prices was increasing as a result
of a monetary expansion, there would be no real effects: The rate of inﬂation
and the rate of wage growth would jointly neutralize the effect of a higher rate
of monetary growth, leaving real activity unaffected.
Phelps (1967) analyzed the problem in more Keynesian terms, based on
a speciﬁcation of a price equation of the following type:15
Pt − Pt−1 = πt = β(ut − u∗) + πe
t, (4)
where u∗ is the “natural rate of unemployment,” in Friedman’s terminol-
ogy, and πe is the expected rate of inﬂation. Phelps argued for this sort
of “expectations-augmented Phillips curve” speciﬁcation on grounds similar
to those of Friedman that we have already discussed: labor suppliers should
make their decisions on real, not nominal grounds.
Further, Phelps studied this inﬂation equation under the assumption of
adaptive expectations,
πe
t = θπt−1 + (1 − θ)πe
t−1, (5)
where 0 <θ<1 governs the weight placed on recent information in forming
expectations. This speciﬁcation implies that if inﬂation were maintained at
any constant level, π, then expected inﬂation would ultimately catch up to it







is equal to one.
The “expectations-augmented Phillips curve” means that unemployment
would be low (u<u ∗) only if agents are surprised. Thus, a policy of main-
taining low unemployment requires consistent underforecasting of inﬂation,
π<π e. But low unemployment could only be brought about by raising
15 There are several cosmetic differences with Phelps’ (1967, equation 3) speciﬁcation. First,
Phelps worked in continuous time while the text equation is in discrete time. Second, Phelps’
speciﬁcation is in terms of a general utilization variable rather than unemployment. Third, Phelps
worked with the expected return on money, which is the negative of the expected inﬂation rate.
Fourth, Phelps employed a nonlinear (convex) speciﬁcation of the link from utilization to inﬂation
rather than a linear one as in the text.332 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the inﬂation rate to a higher and higher level, with expectations always lag-
ging behind because of the adaptive mechanism (5). Hence, the view of
Friedman and Phelps became known as the “accelerationist hypothesis” in
some quarters.
Phelps also stressed that the accelerationist model meant that a tempo-
rary period of low unemployment would bring about a permanently higher
rate of inﬂation. He recognized that this led to an important new dynamic
element in policy design, relative to traditional work that had stressed the
Phillips curve as a stable “menu of policy choice” for the long run. Gen-
erally, a period of temporarily high unemployment would be necessary to
permanentlyreduceinﬂationandsomebasiceconomicmechanisms—suchas
a momentary social planner objective that attributes increasing cost to high
unemployment—making it desirable to smooth the adjustment process.
Overall, the natural rate/accelerationist hypothesis moved the worries of
Samuelson and Solow (1961) about the effects of expectations on the Phillips
curve from second-order to ﬁrst-order status.
Tests of Solow and Gordon
From the perspective of wage and price adjustment equations of the form
prominent in Keynesian theoretical and empirical models, the arguments of
Friedman and Phelps suggested that there were important omitted expecta-
tional terms. Solow (1969) and Gordon (1970) devised tests to determine
whether there was a long-run tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment.
To capture the spirit of these tests, consider a wage equation along the Klein-
Sargan lines, such as (1) above. As above, the nominal wage at a given date
will be Wt and the real wage will be wt = Wt − Pt . However, the inﬂa-
tion terms in (1) are replaced by expected inﬂation, πe
t, with a coefﬁcient α
attached,
 Wt = λ(wt−1 − w∗
t−1) + β(ut − u∗
t ) + απe
t; (6)
other time-varying terms will be omitted for simplicity.16
The tests of Solow and Gordon made diverse use of price and wage equa-
tions, but the essential features can be simply described using this expres-
sion. First, in the wage equation above, the Friedman-Phelps conclusion
obtains if α = 1 since this is simply a restriction on expected real wages and
unemployment,
wt − wt−1 = λ(wt−1 − w∗
t−1) + β(ut − u∗
t ) − (πt − πe
t). (7)
There is, thus, no inﬂuence of inﬂation if expectations are correct and no
tradeoff between real and nominal variables. Solow and Gordon proposed
16 In this expression, w∗ would be the “natural” real wage, similar to the natural rate of
unemployment, u∗.R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 333
to directly estimate the parameter α and to evaluate the accelerationist view
by testing whether α differed signiﬁcantly from unity. Second, this test is
challenging to implement because expectations are unobservable. However,
if expectations are formed adaptively, as in (5), then it is possible to conduct
the test. Solow (1969) estimated parameters such as α for a range of different
valuesofθ,whileGordon(1970)usedamoregeneraldistributedlagbutmain-
tained the requirement that the coefﬁcients summed to unity. This sum of the
coefﬁcients restriction was rationalized by the Phelpsian thought experiment,
comparing a zero inﬂation steady state to a positive inﬂation steady state at
rate π: If the sum of coefﬁcients is one, then expected inﬂation is πe = 0i n
the ﬁrst case and πe = π in the second case.
All of their diverse estimates suggested values of α that were positive, but
signiﬁcantly less than one. Thus, an aggregate demand policy that lowered
unemployment in a sustained manner would create rising inﬂation over time,
as expectations increased, but it would not ultimately be unsustainable.
Rational expectations critique
Sargent (1971) and Lucas (1972a) criticized the tests of Solow and Gordon by
invoking two arguments. First, Sargent and Lucas insisted that expectations
formation should be rational along the lines of Muth (1961). Second, they
constructed example economies in which the accelerationist position was ex-
actly correct, but in which an econometrician using the methods of Solow and
Gordon would reach an incorrect conclusion.
A valuable example arises when inﬂation (π) has a persistent (x) and
temporary (η) component, so that it is generated according to
πt = xt + ηt
xt = ρxt−1 + et,
where ηt and et are serially uncorrelated, zero mean random variables and
|ρ| < 1.
As analysis along the lines of Muth (1960) determines, rational expecta-
tions then are formed according to
Et−1πt = ρ[θπt−1 + (1 − θ)Et−2πt−1] = ρθ
∞  
j=0
(1 − θ)jπt−j−1, (8)
with 0 <θ<1. This is broadly the same form as the adaptive expectations
formula above, except that the distributed lag now is multiplied by ρ, which
captures the degree of persistence of inﬂation.17
17 The inﬂation process implies πt = ρπt−1 + et + ηt − ρηt−1. A “Wold representation”
is πt = ρπt−1 + at − ρ(1 − θ)at−1, with at a forecast error for πt relative to its own past
history. These two processes are observationally equivalent if they imply the same restrictions on334 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
In particular, suppose that inﬂation is somewhat persistent but stationary
so that 0 <ρ<1, and that there is no effect of inﬂation on the real wage,
i.e., α = 1. Then, an econometrician constructing a measure of expectations
  πt−1 = θ
∞  
j=0
(1−θ)jπt−j−1 foranyθ<1= ρπt−1 wouldfacedatagenerated
according to
Wt − Wt−1 = γ(w t−1 − w∗
t−1) + β(ut − u∗
t ) + ρ  πt−1, (9)
and would conclude that α = ρ. That is, the econometrician would estimate
that there was a long-run tradeoff, α<1, even though none, in fact, existed.
The critique played an important role in the evolution of macroeconomic
modeling. Lucas (1972b) built a small-scale general equilibrium macro-
economic model with a short-run Phillips curve arising without any long-run
tradeoff, providing an analytical interpretation of Friedman’s (1968) sugges-
tion about the nature of the link between inﬂation and real activity. Lucas
(1976) expanded the critique of the policy invariance of parameters within
1970s macroeconometric models into a general challenge, noting that similar
difﬁculties were contained in the consumption function and the investment
function, as well as the wage-price block. He stressed that rational expec-
tations and dynamic optimization, which seemed useful as basic postulates
for model construction, inevitably led to such problems. A major revolution
in econometric model construction ensued, leading central banks around the
world to develop new models for forecasting and policy analysis during the
1990s, as we discuss in Section 6.
Shifting unemployment-inﬂation tradeoffs
What is wrong with the sum of coefﬁcients restriction employed by Solow
and Gordon? Sargent (1971) notes that inﬂation through the mid-1960s did
not display much serial correlation, so it is not well forecasted by a moving
average with weights that sum to unity. Intuitively, in an economy in which
there are never any permanent changes in inﬂation, rational expectations are
not designed to guard against this possibility.
Yet, as inﬂation rose and stayed high through the 1970s, empirical model-
builders found estimates of parameter values drifting toward one and were
the variance and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of πt − ρπt−1. (All other autocovariances are zero.)
Using the Wold representation, the forecast is
Et−1πt = ρπt−1 − ρ(1 − θ)at−1 = ρπt−1 − ρ(1 − θ)(πt−1 − Et−2πt)
= ρ[θπt−1 + (1 − θ)Et−2πt−1]
as reported in the text. The covariance restrictions imply var(at) = var(ηt) + 1
1+ρ2 var(et) and
θ = 1 −
var(ηt)
var(at).R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 335
more open to accelerationist models of the Phillips curve. I have searched
for, but have not found, a 1970s study that succinctly shows this drift in
coefﬁcients. McCallum (1994) calculates the sum of coefﬁcients implied by
a ﬁfth-order autoregression for inﬂation estimated over various periods: it is
about one-third in 1966–67, two-thirds in 1968–70, and between .88 and 1.02
for 1973–1980. McCallum’s exercise indicates why econometric modelers
found increasing evidence for the accelerationist hypothesis as the evidence
from the 1970s was added.
Up a derivative: NAIRU models
As inﬂation rose during the mid-1970s, the wage and price blocks of standard
macroeconometricmodelswereaugmentedinvariousways. Oneroutewasto
include expectations terms explicitly but to make these expectations respond
sluggishly to macroeconomic conditions. Another, arguably initially more
popular strategy originates in the work of Modigliani and Papademos (1975).
Theseauthorsarguedthatempiricalmodelsofpriceandwagedynamicswould
have better success if they related changes in inﬂation measures to levels
of real variables. Modigliani and Papademos viewed inﬂation as likely to
accelerate if unemployment was low relative to a benchmark value and as
likely to decelerate if unemployment was high relative to a benchmark. They
argued that this feature, as indicated by points A and C in Figure 9, was far
more important for policy analysis than the question of whether the long-
run Phillips curve had a negative slope (as in P P´) or was vertical (as in
F F´).18 Further, they stressed that “the shading of an area on either side of
NAIRU indicates both uncertainty about the exact location of NAIRU and the
implausibility that any single unemployment rate separates accelerating and
slowing inﬂation.”
The NAIRU model has been commonly captured by a simple model of
the form,
πt = πt−1 + β(ut − un), (10)
a speciﬁcation closely related to that of Phelps (equation [4]), but with past
inﬂation replacing expected inﬂation. Moving up a derivative allowed for a
continuation of empirical research on price and wage inﬂation, which inves-
tigated the consequences adding lags of inﬂation and unemployment as well
as adding shift variables to the basic NAIRU model. Thus, such empirical
investigations built in a particular assumption on the “accelerationist hypoth-
esis” that differed from the earlier research following Phillips, but continued
to study many similar questions. However, uncertainty about the location of
18 In the original unnumbered ﬁgure early in the Modigliani and Papademos (1975) article,
the non-accelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment is marked “NIRU,” but Figure 9 follows the
now-standard acronym. It also corrects a typo in the labelling of the vertical axis.336 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly




































Notes: Modigliani and Papademos (1975) posited a relationship between unemployment
and the change in the inﬂation rate. They stressed that there was a range of unemploy-
ment rates (gray area) over which the effect on inﬂation was quite uncertain. In the
longer run, they did not take a ﬁrm stand on whether there was a tradeoff between the
level of unemployment and the acceleration of inﬂation (the curve P P´) or not (the curve
F F´).
the NAIRU, as Modigliani and Papademos had suggested, led to challenges
in the application of this approach in forecasting and policy analysis.19
Macroeconomic Policy
The Nixon administration came into ofﬁce in 1969 with the aim of reducing
inﬂation via a combination of orthodox ﬁscal and monetary methods, but
sought to do so without prolonging the recession that the country was then
experiencing.
19 Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) document the considerable uncertainty surrounding es-
timates of the NAIRU.R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 337
Gradualism
The Nixon administration initially embarked on a course of “policy gradu-
alism” in an attempt to reduce inﬂation while maintaining real activity and
unemployment at relatively constant levels. In a mid-course appraisal, Poole
(1970)providesausefuldeﬁnitionofsuchpolicies: “Theprescriptionofgrad-
ualism involves the maintenance of ﬁrm but mild restraint until the objectives
of anti-inﬂationary policy are realized. Real output is to be maintained some-
whatbelowpotentialuntiltherateofinﬂationdeclinestoanacceptablelevel.”
The policies outlined in the 1970 Economic Report of the President, produced
under the leadership of CEA chairman Paul McCracken, contained both ﬁscal
and monetary components designed to generate a modest reduction in output
for the purpose of reducing inﬂation.20
Rising understanding of the importance of expectations
Arthur Burns became head of the Federal Reserve System in early 1970,
replacing William McChesney Martin, who had served since 1951. During
1969, Martin had undertaken restrictive monetary policy to reduce inﬂation,
indicating that “expectations of inﬂation are deeply imbedded....Aslowing
inexpansionthatiswidelyexpectedtobetemporaryisnotlikelytobeenough
to eradicate such expectations” and “a credibility gap has developed over our
capacityandwillingnesstomaintainrestraint.”21 Thephrase“credibilitygap”
hadaparticularlyharshringtoit, evenaspartofaself-criticism, asithadbeen
widely used to describe the Vietnam policies of the Johnson administration:
The Tet offensive of September 1968 had convinced many that there was
no credibility to the administration’s previous upbeat forecasts for military
success or its description of the offensive as a disastrous defeat for the Viet
Cong. Martin believed that unemployment was unsustainably low and that
economic growth would need to slow to reduce inﬂation, which was at about
5 percent during late 1968 when Richard Nixon was elected president. But
the restrictive monetary policy of 1969–1970 started by Martin, envisioned as
part of a gradualist strategy by McCracken, and continued by Burns, resulted
only in a slowing of inﬂation, but not a major decline, during the recession of
December 1969–November 1970.
As Hetzel (1998) stresses, Burns had a long-standing belief that expecta-
tions were important for inﬂation, writing in the late 1950s that: “One of the
main factors in the inﬂation that we have had since the end of World War II is
20 Gradualist policies were advocated by a range of economists and policymakers. On this
dimension, the monetarist economists of the Shadow Open Market Committee (SOMC) shared some
of the reservations of their Keynesian counterparts. See Meltzer (1980) for a discussion of the
SOMC perspective on gradualism.
21 Martin’s February 26, 1969, testimony to Congress, quoted in Hetzel (2008, 75).338 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that many consumers, businessmen, and trade union leaders expected prices
to rise and therefore acted in ways that helped to bring about this result.”22
After taking over the Fed, he made the case that it was possible to side-step
the Phillips curve through the imposition of wage and price controls, which




the convertibility of the dollar into gold. The temporary freeze evolved into
a multiyear incomes policy with various phases differing in intensity and
coverage. The 1973 Economic Report of the President noted that “1972 was
the ﬁrst full year in American history that comprehensive wage and price
controls were in effect when the economy was not dominated by war or its
immediate aftermath” (page 51). The Report indicated that there had been
three purposes for the controls (page 53). First, the controls were intended
to directly affect the rate of inﬂation, lower the probability of its increase,
and raise the probability of its decline. Second, the controls were aimed at
“reducing the fear that the rate of inﬂation would rise or not decline further.”
Third, the controls were designed to “strengthen the forces for expansion
in the private economy and to free the Government to use a more expansive
policy.”Indescribingtheconditionsinthespringandsummerof1971thatled
to the imposition of the controls, the Report speciﬁcally discussed “anxiety”
aboutincreasinginﬂationasholdingbackconsumerspendingandrisinglong-
term interest rates that “may have signalled rising inﬂationary expectations.”
Overall,akeymotivationforthecontrolswastoaffectexpectationsofinﬂation
and their incorporation into price and wage setting.
Many analysts see the incomes policy period as involving expansionary
monetarypolicy—asinthethirdReport pointabove—withﬁscalpolicyunder
the Nixon team and monetary policy under Burns producing an economic
expansion. Unemployment hovered in the 6 percent range through 1971,
droppingto5percentbytheendof1972asNixonwonalandslidere-election.
Inﬂation, according to the gross domestic product deﬂator shown in Figure 1,
had fallen from 5 percent in 1971 to 4 percent in 1972, but it then rose to a 7
percent annual rate by the end of 1973.
22 Burns 1957, p. 71, quoted in Hetzel (1998).
23 Burns had played a leading role in the Council of Economic Advisors during the
Eisenhower administration and knew Nixon well. As chairman of the Fed, he played an im-
portant role in administration policy more broadly, including the mid-August 1971 meetings at
Camp David that formulated major changes in Nixon administration economic policies.R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 339
Skepticism about government goals
By the time of the publication of the 1973 Economic Report of the
President, many economists were becoming more skeptical about both the
long-run Phillips curve and, more speciﬁcally, about whether government
plans were consistent with the available information on the historical link-
age between inﬂation and unemployment. The review of the 1973 Report by
the mainstream economist Carl Christ provided one clear presentation of this
skepticism. Henotedthateveryeconomicreportcontainsanoverallstatement
of objectives by the President followed by a more detailed and nuanced report
by his economic advisors.
An initial quote from Christ’s review summarized the condition of the
previous year for us: “Mr. Nixon’s report begins with a review of the good
things about 1972: a 71
2 percent rise in real output, a reduction of the inﬂation
rate (measured by the consumer price index) to about 3 percent from about 6
percent in 1969, and a reduction of the unemployment rate to 5.1 percent in
December 1972 from 6 percent in December 1971.”
The 1973 goals of the Nixon administration were summarized by Christ
using a series of quotations from Nixon’s message: “Output and incomes
should expand. Both the unemployment rate and the rate of inﬂation should
be reduced further, and realistic conﬁdence must be created that neither need
rise again. The prospects for achieving these goals in 1973 are bright—if we
behave with reasonable prudence and foresight” (p. 4); “We must prepare for
the end of wage and price controls...”(p. 6). Christ notes that this buoyant
optimism on inﬂation and unemployment is “reminiscent of Mr. Nixon’s
statement in January 1969, shortly after taking ofﬁce, that he would reduce
inﬂation without increasing unemployment and without imposing wage and
price controls.”
Christ then proceeded to argue that the optimism was unwarranted: “The
evidence strongly suggests it is not possible for the American economy,
structured as it has been since World War II, to achieve simultaneously un-
employment rates that remain at 4.75 percent or less, and consumer price
increases that remain at 2.4 percent a year or less, without wage or price con-
trols. In the 25 years since consumer prices leveled off at the end of World
WarII,thishasbeenachievedinonly4years: 1952, 1953, 1955, and1965....
In those same 25 years, the average unemployment rate was 4.8 percent, and
the average increase in consumer prices was 2.4 percent a year.”
Figure 10 was produced by Christ using data from the 1972 Report. No-
tice that Christ’s argument is not that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical,
although that view is not inconsistent with his ﬁgure. Instead, it is that public
policy goals ought to be consistent with the available evidence and that unem-
ployment far below the 1972 level of 5 percent and inﬂation below the 1972
level of 3 percent did not seem consistent with U.S. experience.340 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly












































Notes: Using data from the 1973 Annual Report, Christ showed that the announced ad-
ministration objectives of inﬂation below 3 percent and unemployment below 5 percent
did not seem consistent with prior U.S. experience.
Christ’s warning was a timely one: The remainder of the Nixon-Ford
administration saw the onset of stagﬂation, as a look back at Figure 1 reminds
us. The United States was not to see 5 percent unemployment and 3 percent
inﬂation at any time in the next two decades.
Humphrey-Hawkins
While Christ may have been skeptical about the internal consistency of the
Economic Report of the President in 1973, the debates over the legislation
put forward by Representative Augustus Hawkins and Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey ﬁve years later illustrated that other elements of government and
society continued to seek very low unemployment.
AsinitiallypassedbytheHouseinMarch1978, theFullEmploymentand
BalancedGrowthActspeciﬁedthegoalofloweringtheunemploymentrateto4R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 341
percentforallworkingageindividualsand3percentforallindividualsoverthe
age of 20. Early drafts of the House bill had mandated that the government be
an “employer of last resort” for the long-term unemployed, but this provision
wasdropped,whilethefocusonunemploymentwasmaintained. Thenational
unemployment goal was to be reached within ﬁve years and the bill called for
cooperation between the executive branch, Congress, and the Federal Reserve
Boardinworkingtowardthespeciﬁedtarget. ItalsospeciﬁedthatthePresident
should submit an annual economic report to Congress including numerical
goals for employment, unemployment, and inﬂation, as well as some other
macroeconomic indicators. Amendments to add budget balance as a goal at
the ﬁve-year horizon and to include an inﬂation goal of 3 percent at that time
weredefeated. ThebillevolvedsubstantiallyinordertogainSenateapproval.
In the process, inﬂation objectives were reinstated. It was signed into law by
President Jimmy Carter on October 27, 1978.
The Full Employment and Balanced GrowthAct in ﬁnal form established
national goals of full employment, growth in production, price stability, and
balance of trade and public sector budgets. More speciﬁcally, it speciﬁed that
by 1983, unemployment rates should be no more than 3 percent for persons
aged 20 or over and no more than 4 percent for persons aged 16 or over.
Inﬂation should be no more than 4 percent by 1983 and 0 by 1988. Thus, in
its nonbinding goals, it displays the same tendencies that Christ identiﬁed in
the Economic Report of the President.
While these goals were nonbinding, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act did re-
quirethattheFederalReserveBoardofGovernorstransmitareporttoCongress
twice a year outlining its monetary policy.
5. UNWINDING INFLATION
By the late 1970s, a wide range of economists and politicians were becoming
concerned about high inﬂation and recommending disinﬂation. However,
economists and politicians differed widely on the costs of reducing inﬂation.
Forecasting the Costs of Disinﬂation
Surveying six estimates of “macroeconomic Phillips curves,” Okun (1978)
found that the experience of the 1970s had led to the abandonment of the
long-run Phillips curve. Yet, he also stressed that “while they are all es-
sentially accelerationist, implying no long-run tradeoff between inﬂation and
unemployment, they all point to a very costly short-run tradeoff.” Thinking
aboutthePhelpsianquestionofhowfastunemploymentshouldberaisedfrom
asituationofinitiallylowcapacityutilization,intermsoftheconsequencesfor
long-run inﬂation, he calculated “for an extra percentage point of unemploy-
ment maintained for a year, the estimated reduction in the ultimate inﬂation342 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
rate.” Comparing the various studies, he found that this disinﬂation gain for
a given amount of unemployment ranged between 1
6 and 1
2 of a percent, with
an average estimate of 0.3 percent.
To put Okun’s numbers in a speciﬁc context, consider the unemployment
cost attached to a 5 percent reduction in long-run inﬂation. The estimates
reported by Okun meant that this cost would be between 10 = [5/(1/2)] and
30 = [5/(1/6)] “point years of unemployment,” with an average estimate of
16.7[5/.3]. That is, if the cost of eliminating a 5 percent inﬂation was spread
evenly over four years, then each year would see an unemployment rate that
was between 2.5 and 7.5 percent above the natural rate with a mean estimate
of over 4 percent.
It is now more standard to discuss disinﬂation costs as a ratio of point
years of unemployment arising from a one percent change in inﬂation, which
is called the “sacriﬁce ratio.”24 Okun’s estimates were that the sacriﬁce ratio
was in the range of 2 to 6, with a mean of 3.3 in that each percentage point
reduction in inﬂation would involve very major economic costs.
Put another way, by the late 1970s, policymakers may have abandoned
the long-run Phillips curve in the face of evidence and theory. But most major
econometric models continued to maintain a tradeoff over horizons of four or
more years, as originally described by Samuelson and Solow. Just as there
had been a protracted period of low unemployment as inﬂation had risen, so
too did Okun envision a protracted period of high unemployment as inﬂation
was reduced.
The perceived severity of a potential reduction in inﬂation is perhaps best
illustrated in an excerpt from James Tobin’s (1980) review of stabilization
policies at the close of the ﬁrst decade of the Brooking’s Panel. To put the
excerpt in context, Tobin’s review described the accelerationist hypothesis as
having been a core part of macroeconomics for the better part of the previous
decade. Tobin wrote that it was broadly recognized that “inﬂation accelerates
at high employment rates because tight markets systematically and repeatedly
generate wage and price increases in addition to those already incorporated in
expectations and historical patterns. At low utilization rates, inﬂation decel-
erates, but probably at an asymmetrically slow pace. At the Phelps-Friedman
“natural rate of unemployment,” the degrees of resource utilization and mar-
ket tightness generate no net wage and price pressures up or down and are
consistent with accustomed and expected paths, whether stable prices or any
other inﬂation rate. The consensus view accepted the notion of a nonaccel-
erating inﬂation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) as a practical constraint on
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policy, even though some of its adherents would not identify NAIRU as full,
equilibrium, or optimum employment.”25
To put the potential costs of a disinﬂation in front of his audience, Tobin
used a very simple inﬂation model with a NAIRU of 6 percent unemployment
and assumed that the economy originated from an inﬂation rate of 10 percent.
AsdisplayedinFigure11,hestudiedagradualdisinﬂationinwhichthecentral
bank reduced the growth rate of nominal aggregate demand smoothly so that
itfallsby1percenteachyearfor10years. Thus,afteradecade,theconditions
forpricestabilityaremetfromtheaggregatedemandside. Tobinalsoassumed
that the expectations term was an eight-quarter, backward-looking average of
recentinﬂationrates. Tobinstressedthattheresultwas“notaprediction!...but
a cautionary tale. The simulation is a reference path, against which policy-
makers must weigh their hunches that the assumed policy, applied resolutely
and irrevocably, would bring speedier and less costly results.” The cautionary
tale of Figure 11 involves an initial decade in which unemployment looks to
average about 8.5 percent, 2.5 percent higher than its equilibrium value, so
that the sacriﬁce ratio during this period is about 2.5 since inﬂation is being
reduced by 10 percent. So, while the tale was cautionary, the message was
consistentwiththerangeofOkun’ssacriﬁceratioestimatesand, hence, meant
to depict some potential consequences of disinﬂation.
There were some skeptics. William Fellner (1976) viewed the govern-
ment policies of the 1970s as sharply inconsistent with the objective of bring-
ing about low inﬂation, echoing Christ’s 1973 concerns. Fellner argued that
households and ﬁrms would be similarly skeptical and that the disinﬂation
process was costly in part because of the imperfect credibility of policies,
so he endorsed a policy of gradualism like that which Tobin explored in his
simulationcoupledwithstrongannouncementsaboutfuturepolicyintentions.
However, economists like Tobin were quite skeptical about the practical im-
portance of this line of argument, while accepting the basic logical point that
expectations effects could mitigate some of the output losses associated with
his gradualist simulation. Considering the beneﬁts of preannounced stabi-
lization plan credibility, Tobin (1980) wrote: “The question is how much.
One obvious problem is that a long-run policy commitment can never be ir-
revocable, especially in a democracy. Important economic groups will not
ﬁnd it wholly credible, and some will use political power to relax or reverse
the policy. Even assuming credibility and understanding by private agents,
25 Thus, Tobin uses the “natural rate” and the “NAIRU” interchangeably when it comes to
the analysis of inﬂation. However, many Keynesian economists did not want to assume that the
level of real activity consistent with constant inﬂation was an efﬁcient level. As discussed above,
Friedman had written that the natural rate was to include “the actual structural characteristics of the
labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and
supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs
of mobility, and so on,” but these conditions had sometimes been ignored in the debate over the
efﬁciency and inevitability of the natural rate.344 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly









































Notes: A simulation study of the unemployment and inﬂation implications of a gradual
reduction in the rate of growth of the money supply, as described in more detail in Tobin
(1980).
their responses are problematic. In the decentralized but imperfectly compet-
itive U.S. economy, wage and price decisions are not synchronized but stag-
gered. It is hard to predict how individual ﬁrms, employees, and unions will
translateathreateningmacroeconomicscenariointotheirowndemandcurves.
If each group worries a lot about its relative status, each group will decide that
the best strategy is to disinﬂate very little.” Thus, Tobin (1980) argued that
it would be “recklessly imprudent to lock the economy into a monetary dis-
inﬂation without auxiliary incomes policies. The purpose of these policies
would be to engineer directly a deceleration of wages and prices consistent
with the gradual slowdown of dollar spending.” In contrast to Fellner’s case
for gradualism, rational expectations theorists like Sargent began to explore
actual disinﬂation experiences, using the lessons of the models that they had
developedinthemid-1970s. Inparticular,inhis“EndsofFourBigInﬂations,”
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anti-inﬂation policies could bring about reductions in inﬂation with relatively
low unemployment costs, as long as such policy changes were credible and
that their dramatic nature enhanced their credibility.
The Volcker Disinﬂation
PaulVolcker assumed the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve System (FRS)
in August 1979. Looking back at Figure 1, we can see that inﬂation was
substantiallyreduced,whiletherewasalengthyperiodofhighunemployment.
As cataloged in many discussions, the Federal Reserve made a high-proﬁle
announcement of a shift to monetary targeting in October 1979 in the face of
rapidly rising inﬂation; there were two recessions during the period, one short
and relatively mild, one lengthy and severe, and the inﬂation rate had declined
dramatically by 1984.
There are many questions about the Phillips curve during this important
historical period, but our focus in this section will be limited to two. First,
how did the unemployment cost of the actual disinﬂation line up with the sug-
gestions of Okun and others? Second, how did the Federal Reserve perceive
the menu of policy choice during this period?
The unemployment cost
Mankiw (2002, 369–701) calculates the unemployment cost of the Volcker
disinﬂation under the assumption that there was a 6 percent natural rate of
unemployment during 1982–1985, with the inﬂation rate falling from 9.7
percent in 1981 to 3 percent in 1985. His annual average unemployment
numbers were 9.5 percent in 1982 and 1983, 7.4 percent in 1984, and 7.1
percent in 1985 so that there was a total cyclical unemployment cost of 9.5
percent of unemployment. One can argue about details of this calculation, for
example with whether the disinﬂation should be viewed as starting in 1980
or in 1981, about the natural rate of unemployment, and so on. But it is a
reference textbook calculation familiar to many: The sacriﬁce ratio during the
Volcker disinﬂation is estimated by Mankiw to be about 9.5/6.7 = 1.5.
Mankiw’s sacriﬁce ratio is about one-half of that which Okun suggested
onthebasisofhismeanestimateandliesbelowthelowendoftherangeinthe
studies that he reviewed. The 6.7 percent decline in the inﬂation rate should
have had the effect of raising the unemployment rate by a total of 22 percent
over the period according to the average estimate, 13.4 percent according to
the low estimate, and over 40 percent for the high estimate. Put another way,
the mean estimate implies that unemployment should have been higher by
more than 5 percent over each year of a four-year disinﬂation period.
Some have suggested that this lower cost was due to increased credi-
bility of the Fed and its disinﬂationary policies under Volcker; others have346 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
suggested that the cost was largely due to the central bank’s imperfect credi-
bility.26 However, as McCallum (1984) points out, the testing of hypotheses
about credibility is subtle because the measures of private expectations about
policy that must be constructed are more involved than in standard rational
expectations models.
The Fed’s Perceived Unemployment Cost
One key question about this disinﬂation period is “How did the Federal
ReserveSystemviewthetradeoffbetweeninﬂationandunemployment?”The
developments reviewed above, in which the nature of the tradeoff was subject
to substantial controversy and evaluated in an evolving model, makes this a
particularly interesting question. It is also not an easy question to answer, as
any central bank is a large organization with many differing viewpoints and
its policymakers do not ﬁle survey answers about their perceived tradeoffs.
However, the question can be answered in part because the Humphrey-
Hawkins legislation requires testimony by the FRS chairman twice a year, in
late January or early February and again in July. For the six FOMC meet-
ings each year, the research staff under Volcker prepared a basic forecast
of the economy’s developments within the “Green Book” under a particular
benchmark set of policy assumptions. For the FOMC meetings that pre-
cede the chairman’s testimony, the staff also prepared a set of alternative
policy options within the “Blue Book” of which Table 1 provides examples
at two FOMC meetings. In both cases, then, the alternative strategies were
framed in terms of growth rates for the M1 concept of money and were based
on the Board’s quarterly macroeconometric (MPS) model along with staff
judgementaladjustments, sothattheyreﬂectedtheeffectsofpre-existingeco-
nomicconditionsaswellasalternativepathsofpolicyvariables.27 Projections
26 To my mind, the role of imperfect credibility in the Phillips curve in U.S. history remains
an open, essential area of research at present. Goodfriend and King (2005) argue that Volcker’s
actions were based signiﬁcantly on his perception that his policy actions were not perfectly credible
and that the nature of the disinﬂation dynamics was also substantially inﬂuenced by imperfect
credibility of policy.
27 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1998, 123) describes the preparation of “blue
book” material, from which the Table 1 entries are taken, as follows: “The blue book provides the
Board staff’s view of recent and prospective developments related to the behavior of interest rates,
bank reserves, and money. The blue books written for the February and July meetings contain
two extra sections to assist the Committee in its preparation for the Humphrey-Hawkins testimony.
The ﬁrst of these sections provides longer-term simulations, covering the next ﬁve or six years.
One of these simulations represents a judgmental baseline, while two or three alternative forecasts
use a Board staff econometric model to derive the deviations from the judgmental baseline under
different policy approaches. Typically, at least two scenarios are explored: one incorporates a
policy path that is designed to bring economic activity and employment close to their perceived
long-run potential paths fairly quickly, and another is intended to achieve a more rapid approach to
stable prices. The section also offers estimates of how different assumptions about such factors as
ﬁscal policy, the equilibrium unemployment rate, or the speed of adjustment to changed inﬂationary
expectations would affect the predicted outcome.”R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 347
Table 1 FRB Economic ProjectionsAssociated withAlternative
Monetary Growth Strategies
January 1980
Strategy 1980 1981 1982
Money Growth 1 6.0 6.0 6.0
2 4.5 4.5 4.5
  = 1 − 2 −1.5 −1.5 −1.5
Inﬂation 1 9.5 8.7 7.7
2 9.1 8.2 6.8
  = 1 − 2 −0.4 −0.5 −0.9
Unemployment 1 8.1 8.9 9.3
2 8.4 10.1 11.6
  = 1 − 2 0.7 1.2 2.3
January 1982
Strategy 1982 1983 1984
Money Growth 1 4.0 3.5 3.0
2 5.5 5.0 4.5
  = 2 − 1 −1.5 −1.5 −1.5
Inﬂation 1 6.4 5.1 4.2
2 6.5 5.4 5.3
  = 2 − 1 −0.1 −0.3 −0.9
Unemployment 1 9.3 9.1 8.9
2 9.0 8.2 6.9
  = 2 − 1 0.3 0.9 2.0
T-Bill 1 13.0 12.5 11.0
2 9.7 8.3 8.4
  = 2 − 1 3.3 4.2 2.6
Notes: These table items are drawn from the Federal Reserve Blue Books “Monetary
Aggregates and Money Market Conditions,” January 4, 1980, page 11, and “Monetary
Policy Alternatives,” January 29, 1982, page 7.
under alternative strategies during theVolcker deﬂation also took into account
forecasted developments in ﬁscal policy, which were being revamped by the
Reagan administration at the time.
The ﬁrst meeting is the January 1980 FOMC session, at which the bench-
mark strategy (called strategy 1 in this meeting) was for 6 percent money
growth over each of three years: 1980, 1981, and 1982. Under this bench-
mark policy, as can be seen by reading across the relevant row of the table,
the forecast was that U.S. inﬂation would gradually decline from 9.5 percent
in 1980 to 7.7 percent in 1982, but that there would be high and rising un-
employment in each year (8.1 percent in 1980, 8.8 percent in 1981, and 9.3
percent in 1982). In this general sense, the forecast incorporated a Phillips
curve but one that depended in a complex manner on initial conditions and348 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
shocks. However, the staff also forecasted unemployment and inﬂation under
an alternative policy, 4.5 percent money growth. Hence, it is possible to use
the difference in forecasts to gain a sharper sense of the tradeoff under alter-
native monetary policies. The forecast differences are listed as the row   in
the table. The January 1980 FOMC meeting corresponded with the onset of
a recession, as later dated by NBER researchers.
The second meeting is the January 1982 FOMC session, at which the
benchmarkstrategy(againcalledstrategy1inthismeeting)wasforagradually
declining path of money growth: 4.0 percent in 1982, 3.5 percent in 1983,
and 3.0 percent in 1984. Again, the FRS staff forecasted declining inﬂation
(from 6.4 in 1982 to 4.2 in 1984) but this time with declining unemployment
(from9.3percentin1982to8.9percentin1984). TheperceivedPhillipscurve
was less evident in these forecasts, but an opportunity to appraise its nature is
afforded by the fact that the staff also prepared forecasts under the assumption
of higher money growth (strategy 2).
There are a number of aspects of the benchmark policy projections that
are notable. First, in each case, strategy 1 is the assumption under which the
Federal Reserve staff made its “Green Book” forecast for inﬂation and real
activityforthecomingyears. Inboth1980and1982,inﬂationwasexpectedto
declinebyabouttwopercentagepointsunderthebenchmarkforecast. Second,
in both 1980 and 1982, the projections implied that a policy change (lowering
moneygrowthby1.5percentforthreeyears)wouldhavenoeffectoninﬂation
within the ﬁrst year. Third, looking out two years after such a policy change,
the alternative Blue Book policy scenarios suggested substantial effects on
both unemployment and inﬂation of changing monetary policy. A shift from
strategy 1 to strategy 2 in 1980 was projected to produce a .9 percent decline
ininﬂationin1982anda2.3percentincreaseinunemploymentin1982. Seen
in terms of a “menu of policy choice,” the unemployment cost in two years of
a 1 percent reduction in inﬂation was 2.3 percent. A 1982 shift from strategy
1 to strategy 2 was predicted to have the same effect on inﬂation at a two-year
horizon, at an unemployment of 2.0 percent.
Proceeding further, we can set a lower bound on the perceived unemploy-
ment cost of disinﬂation by cumulating the “deltas” over the three-year period
and viewing the result as the ﬁrst part of a transition to a 1.5 percent lower
inﬂation rate.28 From that standpoint, in 1980 and 1982, the Fed’s perception
was that the ﬁrst three years of restrictive monetary policy would cost about 4
point years of unemployment to lower the inﬂation rate by 1.5 percent. Thus,
a 6.7 percent decline in the inﬂation rate was perceived to cost no less than 18
28 It is a lower bound because the staff projection would certainly have viewed unemployment
as remaining high beyond the three-year projection in the Blue Book; the unemployment   is
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point years of unemployment and it could have been a good bit higher once
fourth-year costs were included.
Overall, in 1980 and 1982, it seems that the Fed’s perception was that the
disinﬂation would be at least twice as costly as the cyclical unemployment
that was actually experienced. The perceived cost was not too much different
across these years, although it was modestly smaller in 1982, and it was in
line with the consensus estimates of Okun (1978). Accordingly, it does not
seemthattheFedundertookthedisinﬂationbecauseitsresearchstaff, atleast,
believed that the costs would be small.
The Consolidation of Disinﬂation Gains
The reduction in inﬂation during the early 1980s had to be followed up by
a lengthy period of inﬂation ﬁghting, as discussed in Goodfriend (1993). In
particular, upon taking over as chairman in 1987,Alan Greenspan had to ﬁght
aseriesofinﬂationscares. Yet, by1994–1995itseemedthattheUnitedStates
had settled into a period of low inﬂation (about 3 percent) and low unem-
ployment (about 5 percent), essentially returning to conditions that resembled
those in the mid-1950s, where we started our Phillips curve documentary.
6. IN THEAFTERMATH
The year 1996 saw two novel developments on the Phillips curve front, which
are closing snapshots: the completion of version 1 of a new quarterly Federal
Reserve Board macroeconometric model of the United States and an explicit
discussion of Phillips curve tradeoffs by the FOMC.
The Model
The structure and results of large-scale models are notoriously difﬁcult to
convey in a compact and coherent manner. In that regard, the 1996 “Guide to
FRB/US: A Macroeconomic Model of the United States,” edited by Brayton
and Tinsley, is a remarkable document. It provides the reader with a clear
model-building vision and a set of clean experiments that can be used to learn
about the model.
The wage-price block of the new model combines the sort of forward-
lookingprice-settingandwage-settingspeciﬁcationsthatarestandardinmod-
ern macroeconomic analysis, with a set of gradual adjustment speciﬁcations
of the variety that applied econometricians have found useful for ﬁtting data
since the days of Fisher, Klein, and Sargan. The speciﬁc modeling is in the
tradition of the approach to time series econometrics initiated by Sargan and
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t − .003ut,
so that the “equilibrium” price level strongly depends on the gap between the
log nominal wage rate (W) and productivity (a) with weaker effects from the
nominal energy fuel price (P
f
t ), consistent with factor share data. Further,
the unemployment rate has a small effect, via an effect on the desired markup
(the units of measurement imply that a 1 percent increase in unemployment
lowers the desired markup by .3 percent). The adjustment dynamics indicate
thatinﬂationishighasthepriceleveladjustsgraduallytowardthistargetlevel,
via
Pt − Pt−1 = .10(P∗t−1 − Pt−1) + .57lags2[Pt−1 − Pt−2]
+.43leads∞[P ∗




some additional backward-looking adjustment terms with substantial weight,
and variations in the expected target. The requirement that the structural
lead and lag coefﬁcients sum to one, along with similar restrictions in the
companion wage equation, means that the FRB/US model features no long-
run tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment.
Thus, the new model represented a blend of the Klein-Sargan approach,
withanewmacroeconomictheorythatstressesexpectationalelementsofpric-
ing and other behavior. The new FRB/US model also had common elements
with a set of small, fully articulated dynamic models then being developed
in academia (King and Wolman [1996] and Yun [1996]), which were early
examples of the types of new macroeconomic models explored elsewhere in
this Economic Quarterly issue.
The frictions in the model are substantial, as Brayton and Tinsley (1996)
make clear, in that they apply to changes as well as levels. The associated
distributedlagsandleadsarelengthy, averaging3.3quartersforunanticipated
shocks. Hence, there is a short-run Phillips curve in the model that involves
dynamics over many quarters. Figure 12 shows the response to a permanent
decline in the inﬂation rate within the FRB/US model, essentially obtained by
shifting down the constant term in an interest rate rule along Taylor (1993)
lines.
The FRB/US model can be solved under alternative assumptions about
expectation formation, with rational expectations being one speciﬁcation and
amodernversionofadaptiveexpectationsbeingtheother. Moreprecisely,the
second speciﬁcation is expectations based on a vector-autoregression
estimated from a model’s data for a subset of just three of that model’s vari-
ables. The model implies a gradual disinﬂation process as a result of the lagsR. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 351


































































































































Notes: The FRB/US model can be used to calculate the implications of a permanent shift
down in the target inﬂation rate, with results that are reported in Brayton and Tinsley
(1996) and displayed above. The model can be solved under full rational expectations
(solid line) or under a simpler procedure of vector-autoregression (VAR) expectations.
inthepriceandwagespeciﬁcation,butthetransitiontothenewlowerinﬂation
rate is completed within about two years, although the real consequences are
present for several years. Overall, since the reported simulations are in terms
of an output gap, they cannot be directly compared to those considered above.
Yet a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that they are quite major but
smaller than those experienced in the Volcker period or in the MPS model
discussed above. To see why, suppose that we summarize the ﬁgure as indi-
cating that an upper bound on the output loss is a .5 percent output gap on
average for 6 years; this is a 3 percent cumulative output loss. Suppose also
that we use the same Okun’s Law coefﬁcient of 2.5 that links unemployment
to output gaps as in the 1962 Economic Report. Then, the unemployment cost
of a permanent disinﬂation is about 1.2 point years of unemployment for each
point of inﬂation, a number that is in line with ratios reported by Brayton,
Tinsley, and collaborators. The FRB/US team also reported that imperfect352 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
credibility of monetary policy actions can more than double the unemploy-
ment cost of a disinﬂation.
A notable feature of the disinﬂation simulation displayed in Figure 12 is
that monetary policy initially works heavily through expectational channels.
Onimpact, atdate0, thelong-termbondratedropsdramatically(say, 80basis
points), while the federal funds rate moves by much less and only averages
about a 40-basis-point decline over the ﬁrst year. By contrast, the MPS model
simulations of a lower money growth rate displayed nominal interest rate
increases by an average of over 300 basis points for the ﬁrst three years as
shown in Table 1. Thus, the FRB/US model differs importantly from its MPS
predecessorintermsofotherareas, notablythetermstructureofinterestrates,
in ways that are important for monetary policy.
The Background to the Meeting
In 1996, the FOMC conducted a remarkable discussion of its long-run policy
goals, stimulated by earlier calls for an increased emphasis on price stability
by some of its members, as well as the adoption of inﬂation-targeting systems
by other countries around the world. Notably, at a January 1995 meeting,
Al Broaddus, the then-president of the Richmond Fed, had called within the
FOMC for a system of inﬂation reports each year to accompany the Fed chair-
man’s Humphrey-Hawkins testimony.29 Broaddus’ suggestion was opposed
by FRB Governor Janet Yellen in January 1995, but the FOMC had agreed
to continue the discussion in the context of future meetings that preceded the
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony.
WhentheFOMCmetinJanuary1996,theU.S.economyhadbeenexperi-
encing low inﬂation and strong macroeconomic activity for some time. In the
ﬁrstquarterof1996,inﬂationwasrunningatabout2percentperyear,withun-
employmentintheneighborhoodof5.5percent. Since1980,theUnitedStates
had experienced the major decline in inﬂation described in the last section,
during which unemployment had ranged over 10 percent in the last quarter of
1982 and the last two quarters of 1983. In the last year ofVolcker’s chairman-
ship and during the ﬁrst few years of Greenspan’s, a rise in inﬂation had taken
place—from the 2 percent range in 1986 to about 4 percent in 1990—which
had been accompanied by a decline in unemployment.30 Subsequently, dur-
ing 1991 and 1992, there had been a rise in unemployment while inﬂation fell
back in the 2 percent range. Most recently, from mid-1992 through the end
29 Broaddus (2004) used his proposals at this meeting as one of three examples of his use
of macroeconomic principles in practical monetary policy discussion.
30At the time of Greenspan’s appointment in August of 1987, inﬂation was at 2.8 percent,
while unemployment was 5.8 percent.R. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 353
of 1995, there had been about 2 percent inﬂation, while unemployment was
between 5.5 and 6 percent.
These developments are shown in Figure 13, which is a Phillips-style
plot of unemployment and inﬂation during 1980 through 1996. Observations
during the Volcker period are marked with a circle (o) and those during the
Greenspan period are marked with a diamond (♦). This ﬁgure captures the
background to the FOMC’s 1996 discussion. The major disinﬂation is the
ﬁrst half-loop: an interval of declining inﬂation and rising unemployment
between 1980 and mid-1983, followed by an interval of declining inﬂation
and declining unemployment with inﬂation reaching the 4 percent range by
the second quarter of 1984. Subsequently, there was a year in which inﬂation
fellinthe2percentrange, withlittleaccompanyingchangeinunemployment.
The increase in inﬂation between mid-1985 through 1989 was followed by a
decline in inﬂation to the 2 percent range during late 1991 and early 1993,
accompaniedbyincreasesinunemployment. Inlate1993throughearly1995,
unemployment fell sharply, with little change in inﬂation. Thus, the late-
Volcker and early-Greenspan years trace out a full clockwise loop, after the
disinﬂation of 1980–1984. The negative association between inﬂation and
unemployment during the ﬁrst stages of each of these three episodes (one




At the time of the January 1996 meeting, there were two important economic
conditions that occupied the FOMC’s attention. First, there was a sense that
keyaspectsoftheU.S.economywerechanging,withthepossibilityofa“New
Economy” based on computer and communications advances. Second, and
most important for the meeting, the inﬂation rate for personal consumption
expenditureswasrunningatabouta3percentrateandits“core”component—
that stripped of food, energy, and other volatile price components—was run-
ning at about 2.5 percent, but staff forecasts suggested that it was poised to
rise to the 3 percent range as well. The strong real growth in the economy,
coupled with a decline in unemployment to the range of 5.5 percent, had led
some FOMC members to express concerns about inﬂation.
In detailed prepared remarks, Governor Janet Yellen discussed a cost-
beneﬁt approach to determining the optimal long-run rate of inﬂation and the
transition path. She noted that the Board’s new model indicated a cost of
2.5 point years of unemployment for every 1 percent decline in the long-run
inﬂation rate, under imperfect credibility. To warrant a reduction in inﬂation,
she argued that such a cost of permanently lower inﬂation had to be less than
the discounted value of a stream of future beneﬁts. However, Yellen also354 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
































Notes: The inﬂation rate is the year-over-year change in the gross domestic product
(GDP) deﬂator, the unemployment rate is the civilian unemployment rate, quarterly av-
erages of monthly ﬁgures. All data are from the Federal Reserve Economic Database
(FRED) at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
returned to a theme suggested by Phillips’ original research, which was that
there could be particular costs to low rates of inﬂation. Citing research by
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) which argued that worker-resistance to
nominal pay cuts produced a long-run Phillips curve with a negative slope at
lowratesofinﬂation,Yellenalsoarguedforapositiverateoflong-runinﬂation
“to grease the wheels of the labor market.”
As they considered the appropriate long-run rate of inﬂation, the FOMC
decisionmakers took into account their perceived transition costs, their sense
of the beneﬁts from permanently low inﬂation, and their sense of the costs
of permanently low inﬂation. There was diversity in the views reﬂected in
the statements of various members on each of these topics. But, as Broaddus
noted, there was a consensus that the long-run inﬂation rate should not be
higher than the current level of 3 percent. Broaddus and then-Cleveland Fed
President Jerry Jordan stressed the importance of explicit public discussion ofR. G. King: Phillips Curve Snapshots 355
inﬂation objectives as a means of enhancing Fed credibility and thus lowering
the cost of further reductions in inﬂation.
TheFOMCdiscussedhowtodeﬁnepricestabilityasanobjectiveofmon-
etary policy. Greenspan suggested that “price stability is that state in which
expected changes in the general price level do not effectively alter business
or household decisions,” but Yellen challenged him to translate that general
statement into a speciﬁc numerical value. He responded that “the number
is zero, if inﬂation is properly measured.” Yellen said that she preferred 2
percent “imperfectly measured.”
The FOMC settled on 2 percent inﬂation as an interim goal, with a policy
of deliberately moving toward that lower level. Presumably, some members
viewed it as the natural ﬁrst step toward a lower ultimate inﬂation objective,
while others thought of it as an end point. On the second day of the two-
day meeting, Greenspan cautioned the committee that the 2 percent objective
was included within “the highly conﬁdential nature of what we talk about at
an FOMC meeting.” He noted that “the discussion we had yesterday was
exceptionally interesting and important” but warned that “if the 2 percent
inﬂation ﬁgure gets out of this room, it is going to create more problems for
us than I think any of you might anticipate.” He did not elaborate on whether
he was concerned about market or political reactions to the inﬂation goal.
7. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
Withaseriesofsnapshotsoveranearly40-yearperiod,thisarticlehasreviewed
the evolution of the Phillips curve in macroeconomic policy analysis in the
United States. During this period, U.S. inﬂation rose dramatically, initially
duringadecadeofglitteringeconomicperformanceandthenfurtherduringan
interval of stagﬂation. The reversal of inﬂation beginning in the early 1980s
was associated with a major recession, although perhaps not as large a one as
policymakers and economists had feared.
The rise and fall of inﬂation brought about a major change in the style
of macroeconometric models that were used to evaluate policy choices. The
earliest versions of these models featured a substantial long-run tradeoff con-
sistent with the ﬁndings of Phillips over a near-century of U.K. data. The
subsequent evolution of models ﬁrst involved altering their wage-price block
so that there was no long-run tradeoff and then, later, a more comprehen-
sive rational expectations revision that included forward-looking wage and
price-setting structured so that there was no long-run tradeoff.
More generally, the rise and fall of inﬂation led monetary policymakers to
place greater weight on the role of expectations in governing macroeconomic
activity,withcentralbanksworkingtoextractinformationinlong-terminterest
rates about market expectations of inﬂation. Toward the end of the historical




costs of moving to a zero rate of inﬂation and in part to a concern about high
long-run costs of low inﬂation, in the spirit of Phillips’analysis.
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